Superreplication when trading at market indifference prices by Bank, Peter & Gökay, Selim
ar
X
iv
:1
31
0.
31
13
v1
  [
q-
fin
.PR
]  
11
 O
ct 
20
13
Superreplication when trading at market
indifference prices.
P. Bank and S. Go¨kay
Technische Universita¨t Berlin
Institut fu¨r Mathematik
Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany
(bank@math.tu-berlin.de, gokay@math.tu-berlin.de) ∗
August 11, 2018
Abstract
We study superreplication of European contingent claims in dis-
crete time in a large trader model with market indifference prices
recently proposed by Bank and Kramkov. We introduce a suitable
notion of efficient friction in this framework, adopting a terminology
introduced by Kabanov, Rasonyi, and Stricker in the context of mod-
els with proportional transaction costs. In our framework, efficient
friction ensures that large positions of the investor may lead to large
losses, a fact from which we derive the existence of superreplicating
strategies. We illustrate that without this condition there may be no
superreplicating strategy with minimal costs. In our main result, we
establish efficient friction under a tail condition on the conditional dis-
tributions of the traded securities and under an asymptotic criterion
on risk aversions of the market makers. Another result asserts that
strict monotonicity of the conditional essential infima and suprema
of the security prices is sufficient for efficient friction. We give ex-
amples that satisfy the assumptions in our conditions, which include
non-degenerate finite sample space models as well as Levy processes
and an affine stochastic volatility model of Barndorff-Nielsen-Shepard
type.
Keywords: utility indifference prices, large investor, liquidity, superreplica-
tion, monotone exponential tails
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1 Introduction
The problem of superreplicating a contingent claim has been widely studied
in Mathematical Finance. For frictionless diffusion models this stochastic
control problem was first addressed by El Karoui and Quenez [12] and, for
general semimartingales, by Kramkov [21]. Also models with market frictions
have received a lot of attention. For markets with portfolio constraints such
as the prohibition of short selling see, e.g., Cvitanic´ and Karatzas [9], Jouini
and Kallal [17], Fo¨llmer and Kramkov [13], Broadie et al. [5]. For markets
with proportional transaction costs similarly far reaching investigations have
resulted from the work of, e.g., Soner et al. [24], Cvitanic´ et al. [10], Kabanov
and Stricker [20], Campi and Schachermayer [6], Guasoni et al. [16]. For a
complete treatment and list of references, we refer to the book, Kabanov and
Safarian [19]. Recently, superreplication has also been studied in nonlinear
models capturing illiquidity effects by, e.g., C¸etin et al. [8], Go¨kay and Soner
[15], Possamai et al. [23], Dolinsky and Soner [11].
The present paper focusses on the nonlinear large investor model with
market indifference prices developed in Bank and Kramkov [1, 2, 3]. By
contrast to the model discussed in C¸etin et al. [7], C¸etin et al. [8], Go¨kay
and Soner [15], Dolinsky and Soner [11], this model does not postulate a
local cost term depending on the size of the current transaction which would
be attributed to a temporary market impact. Instead, market indifference
prices can be viewed as a way to specify systematically the permanent price
impact of a transaction. While the impact is adverse in the sense that a large
buy order will substantially drive up marginal prices, it is far from obvious
when this impact actually results in an efficient friction, i.e., in real costs to
the large investor. Indeed, if after a purchase no new information becomes
available about the ultimate value of the traded securities, a subsequent
sale of the same position will take place at the same marginal prices, now
processed in reverse order. Hence, the sale will recover all the expenses
incurred from the initial purchase leading to a ‘free roundtrip’. This is similar
to a phenomenon already observed in multi-variate asset price models with
proportional transaction costs where a suitable notion of efficient friction was
introduced by Kabanov et al. [18] to ensure that trades actually incur costs.
With the same purpose in mind, we adopt this terminology for our frame-
work despite the mentioned differences in the models and we thus say that,
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essentially, a model with market indifference prices exhibits efficient friction
if an investor engaging in ever larger positions may face ever higher losses
with positive probability. A simple two-period example with a single market
maker shows that without this weak condition superreplicating strategies
may fail to exist. Our main result, Theorem 3.2, thus develops a readily
verifiable criterion for efficient friction to hold. This criterion is based on
tail conditions for both the conditional distributions of terminal values of
traded securities and the asymptotic risk aversions of market makers. Corol-
lary 3.3 then shows that efficient friction indeed implies the existence of
superreplicating strategies. In models where conditional essential infima and
suprema of security prices are attained on sets with positive probability, The-
orem 4.1 shows that the strict monotonicity of these extrema is also sufficient
for efficient friction, even without extra assumptions on the market makers’
asymptotic risk aversions. We also characterize when a binomial model with
an exponential market maker is complete and find again that this depends on
a monotonicity condition on conditional extrema. As examples where our tail
condition on conditional distributions holds we consider Le´vy processes and
a Barndorff-Nielsen-Shepard model with stochastic volatility; see Section 5.
2 Problem formulation and motivation
Before we can properly formulate the superreplication problem we want to
address in Section 2.2, we first have to introduce the modeling framework we
are going to use.
2.1 Trading at market indifference prices
For our model we shall use a discrete-time version of the framework intro-
duced in Bank and Kramkov [1, 2] which we shall outline briefly in this sec-
tion for the reader’s convenience. Specifically, we consider a financial market
whereM ∈ {1, 2, . . .}market makers quote prices for J ∈ {1, 2, . . .} securities
with respective random payoffs ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψJ) at time T . For simplicity,
the market makers have a common view of uncertainty which is described
by a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t=0,...,T ,P) where F0 = {∅,Ω} up
to P-null sets; in particular ψ ∈ L0(FT ,R
J). The market makers, however,
may have different attitudes towards risk:
Assumption 2.1. Each market maker m = 1, . . . ,M has a utility function
um : R → R which is strictly concave, increasing, twice continuous differen-
tiable with
lim
x↑∞
um(x) = 0.
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Moreover, absolute risk aversion is bounded in the sense that
(1)
1
c
≤ am(x) , −
u′′m(x)
u′m(x)
≤ c, x ∈ R, for some c > 0.
The market makers shall be allowed to trade freely among themselves (e.g.
using a complete OTC market). As a result, they always allocate their total
wealth in a (conditionally) Pareto optimal way, i.e., such that no reallocation
of wealth is possible which would leave one market maker better off and none
of them worse off in terms of (conditional) expected utilities. It is well-known
that mathematically such allocations are most conveniently described as the
maximizers of the representative agent’s utility function
(2) r(v, x) , sup
x1+...+xm=x
M∑
m=1
vmum(x
m), x ∈ R,
where v ∈ (0,∞)M assigns weights to our market makers. For instance, if
α0 = (α
m
0 )m=1,...,M denotes the Pareto optimal initial allocation of wealth
among the market makers, there is a vector v0 ∈ (0,∞)
M , unique up to
scaling by a positive constant, such that
vm0 u
′
m(α
m
0 ) = ∂xr(v0,Σ0), m = 1, . . . ,M,
where
Σ0 ,
M∑
m
αm0
denotes the market makers’ total initial endowment; see, e.g., Lemma 3.2
in [1].
More generally, if by time t = 0, . . . , T the market makers have jointly
acquired in addition x ∈ R units of cash and q ∈ RJ securities ψ, the resulting
total endowment
Σ(x, q) , Σ0 + x+ 〈q, ψ〉
will lead to the representative agent’s expected utility
Ft(v, x, q) , E [r(v,Σ(x, q))|Ft] .
Theorem 4.1 in [3] shows that for each t = 0, . . . , T , this is a saddle function
of class C2 in the variables
(v, x, q) ∈ A , (0,∞)M × R× RJ ,
if, in addition to Assumption 2.1, we impose the following assumption:
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Assumption 2.2. For any x ∈ R and q ∈ RJ there is an allocation β ∈
L0(FT ,R
M) with total endowment Σ(x, q) such that
E [um(β
m)] > −∞, m = 1, 2, . . . ,M.
Theorem 4.1 in [3] shows furthermore that also
Gt(u, y, q) , sup
v∈(0,∞)M
inf
x∈R
{〈u, v〉+ xy − Ft(v, x, q)}
is a twice continuously differentiable saddle function of the variables
(u, v, q) ∈ B , (−∞, 0)M × (0,∞)× RJ
and that Gt and Ft are conjugate in the sense that conversely
Ft(v, x, q) = sup
v∈(0,∞)M
inf
x∈R
{〈u, v〉+ xy −Gt(u, y, q)} , (v, x, q) ∈ A.
In the sequel, we shall study how a single large investor can trade with
the market makers in order to hedge against a liability H with maturity T
by following a judiciously chosen dynamic strategy. So, let Q = (Qt)t=1,...,T
denote the predictable positions the large investor will ask our market makers
to hold in the marketed securities ψ. We then have to describe the predictable
cash balanceX = (Xt)t=1,...,T the market makers will ask for as compensation.
As pointed out in Bank and Kramkov [1, 2] one natural possibility is to have
Xt ∈ L
0(Ft−1,R) determined by utility indifference, i.e., by requiring that
(3) Umt−1 = E [um(α
m
t )|Ft−1] , m = 1, . . . ,M,
where Ut−1 = (U
m
t−1)m=1,...,M ∈ L
0(Ft−1, (−∞, 0)
M) records the market mak-
ers’ conditional expected utilities before the transaction and where αt =
(αmt )m=1,...,M ∈ L
0(FT ,R
M) denotes the (as it turns out) only Pareto opti-
mal allocation of
Σt , Σ(Xt, Qt) = Σ0 +Xt + 〈Qt, ψ〉
for which the indifference relation (3) holds. In fact, as shown by Theorem 4.1
in [2] this cash balance is given by
(4) Xt = Gt−1(Ut−1, 1, Qt)
and the Pareto allocation is determined by the weights
(5) Vt = ∂uGt−1(Ut−1, 1, Qt) .
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Moreover, the market makers’ utilities at time t = 1, . . . , T are given by
(6) Ut = ∂vFt(Vt, Xt, Qt) = (E [um(α
m
t )|Ft])m=1,...,M .
Hence, for any strategy Q the dynamics of the system are uniquely deter-
mined by the initial level of our market makers’ utilities and equations (4),
(5), and (6).
It will turn out to be convenient to denote by Us,u,Q = (Us,u,Qt )t=s,...,T ,
Xs,u,Q = (Xs,u,Qt )t=s+1,...,T , and V
s,u,Q = (V s,u,Qt )t=s+1,...,T the evolution of
the system with (4), (5), and (6) when started at
Us,u,Qs , u ∈ L
0(Fs, (−∞, 0)
M)
at some time s ∈ {0, . . . , T}.
2.2 The superreplication problem of a large investor
With the market dynamics defined for any predictable strategy, we are now
in a position to formulate the large investor’s superreplication problem. As
usual we shall say that an initial capital pi suffices to superreplicate a con-
tingent claim with payoff H ∈ L0(FT ,R) at time T if there is a strategy Q
which generates profits or losses PLQT by time T such that
(7) H ≤ pi + PLQT .
By construction of our market model, the large investor’s gains are the market
makers’ joint losses and so (7) can be recast as the requirement that
(8) X0,u0,QT + 〈QT , ψ〉 ≤ pi −H
where u0 = (Eum(α
m
0 ))m=1,...,M denotes the initial expected utility levels for
our market makers. So the superreplication price of H turns out to be
(9) piH , inf {pi ∈ R : (8) holds for some predictable Q = (Qt)t=1,...,T} .
Remark 2.3. As usual, relations such as (7) and (8) are tacitly understood
in the P-almost sure sense.
Obviously, if for some initial capital pi a strategy Q can be found which
replicates H , i.e., for which we obtain equality in (7) or, equivalently, (8), we
have piH ≤ pi. In fact, we would then have equality in this relation in arbi-
trage free, linear, discrete-time models typically considered in Mathematical
Finance. It may thus be interesting to note that in the highly nonlinear
model under investigation here this may very well not be the case. Indeed,
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as pointed out in Remark 3.12 of Bank and Kramkov [2], there can be two
strategies Q, Q′ which, starting from different initial capitals x < x′, give
the large investor the same terminal wealth x + PLQT = x
′ + PLQ
′
T , H
without this violating absence of arbitrage. As a result, in our nonlinear
illiquid financial model pricing H by replication may not be the appropriate
concept to investigate. By contrast, the notion of superreplication clearly
still makes sense in such a setting but it becomes an issue whether one can
ensure existence of a strategy which superreplicates at the superreplication
price piH , i.e., whether the infimum in (9) is actually a minimum. This issue
will be addressed by our main results.
3 Main results
The main goal of this paper is to identify readily verifiable conditions on
the traded payoffs and the market makers’ risk preferences ensuring that
any claim H can be superreplicated starting from the superreplication price.
This will be accomplished in Theorem 3.2 and its Corollary 3.3 below. The-
orem 3.2 identifies conditions on the tails of both the payoff’s conditional
distribution and of the market makers’ utilities that ensure a form of effi-
cient friction to hold in our model. Corollary 3.3 then shows that in models
with efficient friction optimal superreplication strategies exist.
3.1 Exponential tails decreasing in time
Our first condition ensures that the market makers’ assessment of the riski-
ness of the payoff ψ may change sufficiently between any two trading periods.
The counterexample given in Section 4.1 shows that a condition of this na-
ture is in fact necessary even when we restrict ourselves to the particularly
simple case of a single market maker with exponential utility.
To formulate our condition we introduce the following (partial) order-
ing relation between any two distributions µ, ν on (RJ ,B(RJ)) with finite
exponential moments:
(10) µ ≺ ν :⇐⇒ lim
|q|↑∞
∫
exp (〈q, x〉)µ(dx)∫
exp (〈q, x〉)ν(dx)
= 0 .
Thus µ ≺ ν will hold if the exponential tails of µ are dominated by those
of ν.
The condition we shall impose on the payoff profile ψ amounts to the re-
quirement that the conditional distributions of ψ along the filtration (Ft)t=0,...,T ,
νt , P [ψ ∈ ·|Ft] , t = 0, . . . , T.(11)
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have the potential to decrease at any time in the sense that
(12) P [νt ≺ νt−1|Ft−1] > 0 for all t = 1, . . . , T .
In Section 5 below we shall verify (12) if ψ is the value at time T of a
Brownian motion or even of a Le´vy process (monitored at discrete points
in time). Similarly, one can actually consider terminal values of affine stock
price models such as the Barndorff-Nielsen-Shepard style model presented in
the same section.
3.2 Asymptotic risk aversion
The second condition we have to impose focusses on the market makers’
preferences. It essentially amounts to the requirement that their absolute
risk aversion at −∞ stabilizes at a higher level than at +∞. For a generic
strictly concave, increasing utility function u ∈ C2(R) this amounts to the
condition that the absolute risk aversion a(x) , −u′′(x)/u′(x) satisfies
(13)
∫ 0
−∞
|a− a(x)| dx+
∫ ∞
0
|a− a(x)| dx <∞ for some 0 < a ≤ a <∞ .
It is easy to see that utility functions which are mixtures of exponential
utilities of the form
u(x) , −
∫ a
a
exp(−ax) Υ(da), x ∈ R,
satisfy condition (13), e.g., if the finite Borel measure Υ charges both a and a.
Note that the sup-convolution describing the representative agent’s utility (2)
will inherit this property when each market maker’s utility satisfies it; see
Lemma 3.5 below.
3.3 Efficient friction and existence of superreplication
strategies
In their investigation of the superreplication problem under proportional
transaction costs, Kabanov et al. [18] introduced a notion of efficient fric-
tion which ensured, essentially, that trading incurs costs. We adopt this idea
and terminology for the purposes of our nonlinear model in the following
definition.
Definition 3.1. A financial model in the framework [1] exhibits efficient
friction, if for any time t = 1, . . . , T , for any choice of utility levels un ∈ Ft−1
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with −∞ < infm,n u
n
m ≤ supm,n u
n
m < 0, and for any sequence of strategies Q
n
such that {limn |Q
n
t | = +∞} has positive probability, also the large investor’s
losses X t−1,u
n,Qn
T + 〈Q
n
T , ψ〉 converge to +∞ in probability on a set with
positive probability.
With this notion at hand, we are now in a position to state the main
result of this paper which we will prove in Section 3.4:
Theorem 3.2. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold and assume that the mar-
ket makers’ total initial endowment is of the form Σ0 = Σ˜0 + 〈q0, ψ〉 for
some bounded random variable Σ˜0. Then our model exhibits efficient fric-
tion, if ψ exhibits potentially decreasing exponential tails in the sense that
condition (12) holds and if, in addition, our market makers’ risk aversions
stabilize at a higher level at −∞ than at +∞ in the sense that they sat-
isfy (13) for constants 0 < am ≤ a
m <∞, m = 1, . . . ,M .
As a corollary, let us note that indeed efficient friction ensures the exis-
tence of optimal superreplicating strategies.
Corollary 3.3. Let Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. If our model exhibits
efficient friction, any contingent claim H can be superreplicated by an in-
vestment strategy QH with minimal initial capital pi = piH as in (9).
Proof. Recalling the convention that inf∅ = +∞, we can assume that there
are finite pin and strategies Qn such that
(14) pin ↓ piH and X0,u0,Q
n
T + 〈Q
n
T , ψ〉 ≤ pi
n −H, a.s. n = 1, 2, . . . .
In particular, we have that the large investor’s losses are bounded from above
uniformly in n:
(15) sup
n=1,2,...
{
X0,u0,Q
n
T + 〈Q
n
T , ψ〉
}
<∞ a.s .
We shall proceed inductively to construct a limiting strategy QH which
superreplicates H starting with the minimal initial capital piH . In fact, for
t = 1 we can apply the efficient friction property (with un , u0, n = 1, 2, . . .)
to obtain that (15) rules out that |Qn
′
1 | explodes to +∞ with positive prob-
ability along any subsequence n′. Hence, supn |Q
n
1 | < ∞ and so we can
choose a subsequence, again denoted by Qn, such that Q∗1 , limnQ
n
1 exists
in L0(F0,R
J) (see, e.g., Lemma 1.64 in Fo¨llmer and Schied [14]). The con-
tinuity of our system dynamics specifying cash balances X0,u,Q
n
(cf. (4)),
weights V 0,u,Q
n
(cf. (5)), and utilities U0,u,Q
n
(cf. (6)) then ensures that
the induced utilities U0,u,Q
n
1 are bounded away from zero and −∞. We
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thus can now let un , U0,u,Q
n
1 , n = 1, 2, . . ., and, observing that then
X0,u0,Q
n
T = X
1,un,Qn
T , proceed successively in just the same way to construct
a limiting QHt ∈ L
0(Ft−1,R
J) for t = 2. The same reasoning applies for
t = 3, . . . , T .
Since along the way the superreplication property (14) is preserved for all
the successive subsequences, the limiting strategy QH will also superreplicate
but only need the minimal initial capital piH . The proof is accomplished.
3.4 Proof of Theorem 3.2
The proof of Theorem 3.2 relies on three auxiliary results. The first shows
that when the market makers’ risk aversion stabilize asymptotically the same
is true for the representative agent’s risk aversion:
Lemma 3.4. Assume the market makers have utility functions um, m =
1, . . . ,M satisfying Assumption 2.1 and suppose in addition that risk aver-
sions am(x) , −u
′′
m(x)/u
′
m(x) stabilize at ±∞ in the sense that (13) holds
for u , um with respective constants a = am, a = am, m = 1, . . . ,M .
Then for any choice of v ∈ (0,∞)M also the representative agent’s utility
r(v, .) of (2) exhibits stabilizing risk aversion in the same sense namely at
levels a, a given by
1
a
=
M∑
m=1
1
am
and
1
a
=
M∑
m=1
1
am
.
Proof. Let ar(v, x) , −∂
2
xr(v, x)/∂xr(v, x), x ∈ R, denote the representative
agent’s absolute risk aversion. It is straightforward to check (see, e.g., [1])
that
ar(v, x) =
1∑M
m=1
1
am(x̂m(v,x))
,
where (x̂m(v, x))m=1,...,M denotes the unique point in R
M at which the sup
in (2) is attained.
Observing that the function f(a1, a2, . . . , am) ,
1∑M
m=1
1
am
is Lipschitz con-
tinuous in (am)m=1,...,M ∈ (0,∞)
M with constant 1 for the ‖.‖1-norm on R
M
we first note that
|ar(v, x)−a| =
∣∣f(a1(x̂1), . . . , aM(x̂M))− f(a1, . . . , aM)∣∣ ≤ M∑
m=1
|am(x̂
m)− am| .
From, e.g., Lemma 3.2 in [3] we obtain
∂xx̂
m(v, x) =
1/am (x̂
m(v, x))∑M
k=1 1/ak (x̂
k(v, x))
, m = 1, . . . ,M,
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which is uniformly bounded away from 0 and 1. Hence,∫ ∞
0
|am (x̂
m(v, x))− am| dx =
∫ ∞
x̂m(v,0)
|am(y)− am| (∂xx̂
m(v, y))−1 dy <∞
since am satisfies condition (13). Together with the above Lipschitz estimate
this yields that (13) holds for ar(v, x) and ar. The argument for stabilization
at −∞ is the same.
The second lemma will allow us to compare a utility function satisfying
condition (13) with a sum of two exponential utilities:
Lemma 3.5. If a strictly concave, increasing utility function u ∈ C2(R) with
limx↑∞ u(x) = 0 satisfies condition (13), then there are constants C1, C2 > 0
such that
(16) C1
(
−e−ax − e−ax
)
≤ u(x) ≤ C2
(
−e−ax − e−ax
)
, x ∈ R
where a and a are the same constants as in (13).
Proof. First, we note that
(17) u(x) = −u′(0)
∫ ∞
x
exp
(
−
∫ y
0
a(z)dz
)
dy, x ∈ R .
Hence, by L’Hopital’s rule,
lim
x→∞
u(x)
−e−ax
= lim
x→∞
u′(0)
∫∞
x
exp
(
−
∫ y
0
a(z)dz
)
dy
e−ax
= lim
x→∞
u′(0) exp
(
−
∫ x
0
a(z)dz
)
ae−ax
=
u′(0)
a
exp
(∫ ∞
0
(a− a(z)) dz
)
∈ (0,∞)
due to the integrability condition (13). It follows that
(18) − c2e
−ax ≤ u(x) ≤ −c1e
−ax, x > 0,
for positive constants c1 and c2. In conjunction with 0 < a ≤ a this yields
lim sup
x→∞
u(x)
−e−ax − e−ax
≤ lim sup
x→∞
c2e
−ax
e−ax + e−ax
<∞
as well as
lim inf
x→∞
u(x)
−e−ax − e−ax
≥ lim inf
x→∞
c1e
−ax
e−ax + e−ax
> 0.
This shows that there exists C2 > 0 such that the right estimate of (16) holds
true. The argument for finding C1 > 0 such that the left estimate holds is
completely analogous.
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The comparison with exponential utilities is also at the heart of the fol-
lowing technical result:
Lemma 3.6. Let u ∈ C2(R) be a strictly concave, increasing utility function
with limx↑∞ u(x) = 0 whose risk aversion is bounded away from zero and
infinity and satisfies condition (13) for some constants 0 < a ≤ a < ∞.
Define f(x) , x− (−x)a/a for x ≤ 0.
There exists a positive constant C > 0 depending only on the utility func-
tion u such that
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft] ≥Cf
(
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft−1]
)
for any x ∈ R, any t = 1, . . . , T and any random variable Σ with finite
exponential moments E exp(−aΣ) + E exp(−aΣ) <∞.
Proof. Let t = 1, 2, . . . , T be arbitrary. For given Σ with the above finite
exponential moments and for any fixed x ∈ R, the growth estimate (16) of
Lemma 3.5 allows us to define the Ft−1-measurable random variable ξ by
(19) E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1] = C2E [− exp (−a (ξ + Σ)) |Ft−1] ,
where C2 > 0 is any constant such that (16) holds. By the same estimate we
obtain
C2E [− exp (−a (ξ + Σ)) |Ft−1] = E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1]
≤ C2E [− exp (−a (x+ Σ)) |Ft−1] ,
which implies that ξ ≤ x. We use this in the other part of estimate (16) to
deduce
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft]
≥ C1E [− exp (−a (x+ Σ))− exp (−a (x+ Σ)) |Ft]
≥ C1E [− exp (−a (ξ + Σ))− exp (−a (ξ + Σ)) |Ft]
= C1 {− exp (−aξ)E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft]− exp (−aξ)E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft]}
By definition of ξ we can write
− exp (−aξ) =
1
C2
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft−1]
.
This yields
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft] ≥
C1
C2
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft−1]
− C1
(
−
1
C2
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft−1]
)a/a
E
[
exp (−aΣ)a/a |Ft
]
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and after applying Jensen’s inequality with the concave function x 7→ xa/a
we see that there is a constant C > 0 such that
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft] ≥C
{
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft−1]
−
(
−E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft−1]
)a/a}
=Cf
(
E [u (x+ Σ) |Ft−1]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft]
E [exp (−aΣ) |Ft−1]
)
where f is as defined in the assertion of our lemma.
We are finally in a position to give the
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , T} and Qn, un, n = 1, 2, . . . be as
in Definition 3.1. For notational simplicity let us denote
Uns , U
t−1,un,Qn
s , X
n
s , X
t−1,un,Qn
s , V
n
s , V
t−1,un,Qn
s , s = t, . . . , T .
We first recall that by Theorem 4.2 in [3] Gt−1 is contained in G˜
2(c), a class
of saddle functions introduced there. Property (G7) of these special saddle
functions amounts in our context to
(20)
1
c
≤ −um,nV m,nt ≤ c
where c is the bound on the market makers’ risk aversions occurring in (1).
Thus, since by assumption (−um,n)n=1,2,... is bounded away from zero and
∞, so are the weights V m,nt , n = 1, 2, . . . for any m = 1, . . . ,M . As a
consequence V mt , infn=1,2,... V
m,n
t > 0 and V
m
t , supn=1,2,... V
m,n
t <∞ yield
finite Ft−1-measurable bounds on the initial weight of each market maker
m = 1, . . . ,M .
Let us next argue that
0 ≥〈V t, U
n
t 〉 ≥ 〈V
n
t , U
n
t 〉 = E [r(V
n
t ,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))|Ft](21)
≥E
[
r(V t,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))
∣∣Ft](22)
≥CV tf
(
E
[
r(V t,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))
∣∣Ft−1](23)
·
E [ exp(−aΣ(0, Qnt ))|Ft]
E [exp(−aΣ(0, Qnt ))|Ft−1]
)
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for some random variable CV t > 0. Indeed, the estimates in (21) are immedi-
ate from 0 < V mt ≤ V
m,n
t and U
m,n
t < 0, m = 1, . . . ,M . The identity in (21)
holds because, by (6), Unt is the vector of Ft-conditional expected utilities
that our market makers obtain when at time t − 1 the Pareto allocation of
Σ(Xnt , Q
n
t ) is formed given the weights V
n
t . Estimate (22) follows because the
representative agent’s utility function r(v, x) is decreasing in the weights v.
Finally, (23) follows because our Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 above allow us to apply
Lemma 3.6 to the (random) utility function u , r(V t, .) which provides us
with the required random variable CV t > 0.
Recalling that Σ0 = Σ˜0 + 〈q0, ψ〉 with q0 ∈ R
J and bounded Σ˜0, we have
the following estimate for the ratio in (23):
E [exp(−aΣ(0, Qnt ))|Ft]
E [exp(−aΣ(0, Qnt ))|Ft−1]
≤ e2a‖Σ˜0‖∞
E [exp(−〈a(q0 +Q
n
t ), ψ〉)|Ft]
E [exp(−〈a(q0 +Qnt ), ψ〉)|Ft−1]
.
By our assumption of decreasing exponential tails the latter ratio and, thus,
also the former ratio converge to zero on Dt , {νt−1 ≺ νt}∩{limn |Q
n
t | =∞}.
This is a set with positive probability
P [Dt] = E
[
1{limn |Qnt |=∞}P [νt−1 ≺ νt|Ft−1]
]
,
which is strictly positive by (12). We shall argue below that
(24) 0 ≥ E
[
r(V t,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))
∣∣Ft−1] ≥ 〈V t, un〉 , n = 1, 2, . . . ,
and so the first conditional expectation in (23) is bounded in n by assumption
on (un)n=1,2,.... As a consequence, the right side in (23) converges to f(0) = 0
on Dt when n ↑ ∞. This implies 〈V t, U
n
t 〉 → 0 on this set. Since V
m
t > 0,
m = 1, . . . ,M , this yields that actually Unt → 0 on Dt. Because U
n is a
martingale, we have Unt = E [U
n
T |Ft] and so U
n
T → 0 in probability on Dt.
This, however, is equivalent to XnT + 〈Q
n
T , ψ〉 =
∑M
m=1 u
−1
m (U
m,n
T )− Σ0 →∞
in probability on Dt which establishes the asserted efficient friction.
It remains to verify (24). For this, note that the Pareto allocation αnt of
Σ(Xnt , Q
n
t ) with weights V
n
t gives us
r(V t,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t )) ≥
M∑
m=1
V
m
t um(α
m,n
t ), n = 1, 2, . . . .
Our model’s utility indifference principle (3) yields
E [um(α
m,n
t )|Ft−1] = U
m,n
t−1 = u
m,n, m = 1, . . . ,M, n = 1, 2, . . . ,
and so (24) follows by taking an Ft−1-conditional expectation in the preced-
ing estimate and recalling that V t is Ft−1-measurable.
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4 Ramifications
In this section we collect a few supplementary results and illustrations. We
first illustrate in Section 4.1 that our tail condition on ψ, (12), is neces-
sary for the existence of optimal superreplicating strategies even in a simple
binomial model with two periods and one exponential market maker. We
furthermore show in Section 4.2 that under more stringent assumptions on
ψ, efficient friction holds even without the requirement on the market mak-
ers’ risk aversions. Section 4.3 is finally concerned with the special case of a
general multi-period binomial model.
4.1 A binomial model where the superreplication price
is not attained
We consider a two-period model with one asset and one market maker, where
Ω , {−1,+1}2. For ω = (y1, y2) ∈ Ω, let Yt(ω) , yt be the projection of
ω to its t-th component, t = 1, 2. The filtration (Ft)t=0,1,2 is generated by
Y = (Yt)t=1,2. The distribution of Y is determined by
P[Y1 = +1] , p1, P[Y2 = +1 | Y1 = +1] , p2, P[Y2 = +1 | Y1 = −1] , p3,
where p1, p2, p3 ∈ (0, 1) with p2 6= p3. Moreover, the single market maker’s
utility function is given by u(x) , −e−αx for α > 0, the initial endowment is
Σ0 , 0 and ψ is determined by
ψ (Y1,+1) , ψ
u, ψ (Y1,−1) , ψ
d with ψu > ψd.
The specific form of exponential utility and predictability of the cash
balance XQ of the strategy Q yield that
−1 = u(0) = E
[
u
(
XQ1 +Q1ψ
)]
= −E
[
e−α(X
Q
1
+Q1ψ)
]
= −e−αX
Q
1 E
[
e−αQ1ψ
]
.
Thus
XQ1 =
1
α
log
(
E
[
e−αQ1ψ
])
and the utility level UQ1 at time 1 of the strategy Q satisfies
UQ1 = −
E
[
e−αQ1ψ|F1
]
E [e−αQ1ψ]
.
By direct calculation, we find that
(25) UQ1 = −
Ae−αQ1(ψ
u−ψd) + (1− A)
Be−αQ1(ψu−ψd) + (1− B)
with A ,
{
p2 if Y1 = +1
p3 if Y1 = −1
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and B , p1p2 + (1− p1)p3 in our model.
We consider taking ever larger positions at the first time step and liqui-
dating our positions in the second time step. So let (Qn1 )n∈N be a sequence
such that Qn1 →∞ as n→∞. Then
Un1 , U
Qn
1 → U1 = −
1 −A
1 −B
as n→∞.
Since we liquidate our position after the first period, Qn2 = 0 for every n =
1, 2, . . .. This amounts to Un1 = −e
−αXn
2 and thus
lim
n
Xn2 = X2 ,
1
α
log
(
−
1
U1
)
=
1
α
log
(
1− B
1− A
)
,
because of predictability of X .
Next we shall show that the superreplicating cost of the claimH , −X2 ∈
F1 is pi
H = 0 and that there exists no strategy Q that superreplicates with
initial capital piH = 0. Let us first show piH ≤ 0. Since −Xn2 → H , there
exists a sequence of real numbers εn ↓ 0 as n ↑ ∞ and
εn −X
n
2 ≥ H, n = 1, 2, . . . .
Moreover, the strategy (Qnt )t=1,2 = (Q
n
1 , 0) yields the cash balance X
n
2 for all
n = 1.2. . . .. Therefore, εn ≥ pi
H for every such n and by sending εn ↓ 0, we
obtain that piH ≤ 0. Thus if piH is not zero, then there exists ε > 0 and a
superreplicating strategy Q˜ with cash balance X˜ such that
−ε − X˜2 − Q˜2ψ ≥ H .
Hence,
X˜2 + Q˜2ψ < ε+ X˜2 + Q˜2ψ ≤ −H .
Moreover, by construction of H , we have E [u(−H)] = u(0). These two
observations lead to the contradiction
u(0) = E
[
u
(
X˜2 + Q˜2ψ
)]
< E [u(−H)] = u(0).
It remains to show that piH = 0 is not attained by any strategy Q˜. If Q˜ is
a strategy that superreplicates with initial capital piH = 0 and cash balance
X˜ , i.e.
−X˜2 − Q˜2ψ ≥ H ,
then
E
[
u
(
X˜2 + Q˜2ψ
)]
= u(0) = E [u(−H)]
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yields that X˜2 + Q˜2ψ = −H = X2. Then since X2 is F1 measurable,
E
[
u
(
X˜2 + Q˜2ψ
)
|F1
]
= E [u(X2)|F1] = u(X2).
So u(X2) is the utility level at time 1 of the strategy Q˜, i.e. U
Q˜
1 = u(X2).
However, by differentiating equation (25) we obtain
∂
∂Q1
UQ1 = α
(
ψu − ψd
)
e−αQ1(ψ
u−ψd) A− B(
Be−αQ1(ψ
u−ψd) + (1− B)
)2 ,
where A and B are given as in (25). Without loss of generality assume that
p2 > p3. Then, U
Q
1 is strictly increasing in Q1 on the set {Y1 = +1} and
strictly decreasing on {Y1 = −1}. Since the utility level u(X2) is the limiting
value of positions Qn1 tending to +∞ and U
Q
1 is strictly monotone, there
cannot exist a finite Q˜1 with utility level u(X2), a contradiction.
4.2 Efficient friction when extremal payoffs may change
any time
In this section we will consider the special case where only one security is
marketed and so ψ is a real-valued random variable. Let us denote by ψ
t
its
Ft-measurable essential infimum of ψ and by ψ
t
its Ft-measurable essential
supremum, i.e.
ψ
t
, ess sup {ζ ∈ Ft : ζ ≤ ψ} and ψ
t
, ess inf {ζ ∈ Ft : ζ ≥ ψ} .
Proposition 1. A single security ψ ∈ L0(R) exhibits decreasing exponential
tails in the sense of condition (12) if its conditional infima and suprema are
potentially strictly monotone, i.e., if
(26) P
[
ψ
t−1
< ψ
t
, ψ
t−1
> ψ
t
∣∣∣Ft−1] > 0, t = 1, . . . , T.
Moreover, if |Ω| <∞ or, more generally, if
(27) P
[
ψ = ψ
t
∣∣∣Ft] > 0 and P [ψ = ψt∣∣∣Ft] > 0, t = 0, . . . , T,
then conditions (12) and (26) are even equivalent.
Proof. Since
A ,
{
ψ
t−1
< ψ
t
, ψ
t−1
> ψ
t
}
=
⋃
ε>0
{
ψ
t−1
+ ε < ψ
t
, ψ
t−1
− ε > ψ
t
}
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the implication ‘(26) =⇒ (12)’ will follow if we show
{
ψ
t−1
+ ε < ψ
t
, ψ
t−1
− ε > ψ
t
}
⊆
{
lim
|q|→∞
E
[
eqψ|Ft
]
E [eqψ|Ft−1]
= 0
}
for any ε > 0. To this end, note that because ψ
t−1
is Ft−1-measurable, we
obtain the following estimate for any q > 0 :
E
[
eqψ|Ft−1
]
≥ E
[
eqψ1{
ψ>ψ
t−1
−ε
}∣∣Ft−1]
≥ exp
(
q
(
ψ
t−1
− ε
))
P
(
ψ > ψ
t−1
− ε|Ft−1
)
.
Now P
(
ψ > ψ
t−1
− ε|Ft−1
)
> 0 by definition of the conditional essential
supremum ψ
t
.
So
0 ≤ lim
q→∞
E
[
eqψ|Ft
]
E [eqψ|Ft−1]
≤ lim
q→∞
exp
(
q
(
ψ
t
− ψ
t−1
+ ε
))
P
(
ψ > ψ
t−1
− ε|Ft−1
) = 0
on the set
{
ψ
t−1
+ ε < ψ
t
, ψ
t−1
− ε > ψ
t
}
.
Similarly for q < 0, we use the estimate
E
[
eqψ|Ft−1
]
≥ E
[
eqψ1{
ψ<ψ
t−1
+ε
}|Ft−1
]
≥ exp
(
q
(
ψ
t−1
+ ε
))
P
(
ψ < ψ
t−1
+ ε|Ft−1
)
to deduce that
0 ≤ lim
q→−∞
E
[
eqψ|Ft
]
E [eqψ|Ft−1]
≤ lim
q→−∞
exp
(
q
(
ψ
t
− ψ
t−1
− ε
))
P
(
ψ < ψ
t−1
+ ε|Ft−1
) = 0
on the set
{
ψ
t−1
+ ε < ψ
t
, ψ
t−1
− ε > ψ
t
}
, because P
(
ψ < ψ
t−1
+ ε|Ft−1
)
>
0. This establishes the first claim.
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For the second claim, we note that given (27) holds we obtain by domi-
nated convergence
lim
q↓−∞
E
[
eqψ
∣∣Ft]
E [eqψ|Ft−1]
= lim
q↓−∞
E
[
eqψ
(
1{
ψ=ψ
t−1
} + 1{
ψ>ψ
t−1
}
)∣∣∣∣Ft]
E
[
eqψ
(
1{
ψ=ψ
t−1
} + 1{
ψ>ψ
t−1
}
)∣∣∣∣Ft−1]
= lim
q↓−∞
eqψt−1
{
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft]+ E [eq(ψ−ψt−1)1{ψ>ψ
t−1
}
∣∣∣∣Ft]}
eqψt−1
{
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft−1]+ E [eq(ψ−ψt−1)1{ψ>ψ
t−1
}
∣∣∣∣Ft−1]}
=
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft]
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft−1]
and, similarly,
lim
q↑+∞
E
[
eqψ
∣∣Ft]
E [eqψ|Ft−1]
=
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft]
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft−1] .
So, if the conditional supremum and infimum both change from time t−1 to
t with positive probability, the above ratios of conditional probabilities are
zero along the limits as q ↓ −∞ and q ↑ +∞. This was to be shown.
Our next result illustrates that our assumption of stabilizing asymptotic
risk aversions formulated in Theorem 3.2 is not needed for efficient friction
to hold when essential suprema and infima are strictly monotone:
Theorem 4.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, a model with a single mar-
keted security ψ satisfying condition (26) exhibits efficient friction.
Remark 4.2. As an application of this theorem, all non-degenerate trinomial
and higher monomial models exhibit efficient friction.
Proof. We start with the same observations as in the proof of Theorem 3.2
and note that up to and including the estimate (22) all arguments hold true
under the assumptions of the present theorem.
It thus suffices to identify, for t = 1, . . . , T , a set Dt ∈ Ft with posi-
tive probability where E
[
r(V t,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))
∣∣Ft] → 0. It then follows that
〈V t, U
n
t 〉 → 0 on this set and, just as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can
conclude that Unt → 0 and, thus, also U
n
T → 0 in probability on Dt. As
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before this is equivalent to XnT + Q
n
Tψ → ∞ in probability on Dt, proving
the asserted efficient friction.
By working with subsequences we can confine ourselves to the case where
{limnQ
n
t = ±∞} has positive probability. The argument on {limnQ
n
t = −∞}
being similar, let us assume that the set {limnQ
n
t = +∞} has positive prob-
ability. Clearly, on {Qnt > 0} we have
0 ≥ E
[
r(V t,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))
∣∣Ft]
≥ E
[
r(V t,Σ0 +Q
n
t (ψt +X
n
t /Q
n
t ))
∣∣∣Ft] .
By condition (26) we can find an ε > 0 such that Dt , {limnQ
n
t = +∞} ∩{
ψ
t−1
+ ε < ψ
t
, ψ
t−1
− ε > ψ
t
}
has positive probability, since {limnQ
n
t = +∞}
is Ft−1-measurable and
Dt ↑
{
lim
n
Qnt = +∞
}
∩
{
ψ
t−1
< ψ
t
, ψ
t−1
> ψ
t
}
as ε ↓ 0. We shall argue in Lemma 4.3 below that
lim
n
Xnt /Q
n
t = −ψt−1 on
{
lim
n
Qnt = +∞
}
.
On Dt we can thus furthermore find a random variable N
ε such that for
n > N ε the above estimation can be continued by
· · · ≥E
[
r(V t,Σ0 +Q
n
t (ψt +X
n
t /Q
n
t ))
∣∣∣Ft]
≥E
[
r(V t,Σ0 +Q
n
t (ψt − ψt−1 − ε/2))
∣∣∣Ft]
≥E
[
r(V t,Σ0 +Q
n
t ε/2)
∣∣Ft] .
On Dt the latter expression converges to zero by dominated convergence as
required.
The following lemma establishes the asymptotics of cash balances for
extreme long and short positions in ψ:
Lemma 4.3. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 we have
(28) lim
n
Xnt /Q
n
t = −ψt−1 on
{
lim
n
Qnt = +∞
}
and
(29) lim
n
Xnt /Q
n
t = −ψ
t−1
on
{
lim
n
Qnt = −∞
}
for any sequence of strategies (Qn)n=1,2,... with cash balances (X
n)n=1,2,... such
that (Unt−1)n=1,2,... is bounded away from 0 and −∞.
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Proof. The argument for (29) being similar, let us establish (28). To see that
‘≥’ holds, we note that〈
V nt , U
n
t−1
〉
= E [〈V nt , U
n
t 〉|Ft−1] = E [r(V
n
t ,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))|Ft−1]
is bounded by assumption on un , Unt−1 because (20) holds for our choice of
V nt , n = 1, 2, . . . . Moreover, the last term is easily estimated for any A ∈ FT :
E [r(V nt ,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))|Ft−1] ≤ E [r(V t,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))1A|Ft−1]
≤ E [ (r(V t,Σ0) + ∂xr(V t,Σ0)(X
n
t +Q
n
t ψ))1A|Ft−1] .
On {limnQ
n
t = +∞} we thus can divide by the Ft−1-measurable quantity
Qnt in this series of inequalities and let n ↑ ∞ to deduce that
0 ≤ E
[
∂xr(V t,Σ0)(lim inf
n
Xnt /Q
n
t + ψ)1A
∣∣∣Ft−1] .
As A ∈ FT is arbitrary, this implies that
lim inf
n
Xnt /Q
n
t + ψ ≥ 0,
i.e., −ψ
t−1
≤ lim infnX
n
t /Q
n
t , because X
n
t , Q
n
t are Ft−1-measurable for all
n = 1, 2, . . ..
On the other hand,〈
V nt , U
n
t−1
〉
= E [r(V nt ,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))|Ft−1]
is also bounded away from zero, again by assumption on (un)n=1,2,... and (20).
Moreover, on {Qnt > 0},
E [r(V nt ,Σ(X
n
t , Q
n
t ))|Ft−1] ≥ E
[
r(V t,Σ0 +X
n
t +Q
n
t ψt−1)
∣∣∣Ft−1] .
Because Xnt and Q
n
t are Ft−1-measurable, n = 1, 2, . . . , this implies that
supn
{
Xnt +Q
n
t ψt−1
}
<∞. On {limnQ
n
t = +∞} this yields lim supnX
n
t /Q
n
t+
ψ
t−1
≤ 0, proving ‘≤’ in (28).
4.3 (In)completeness of binomial models with expo-
nential market makers
Next we consider a model with time horizon T , one market maker M = 1
with exponential utility u(x) = −e−αx, x ∈ R, one asset J = 1 and initial
endowment Σ0 satisfying E
[
e−αΣ0
]
< ∞ for the market maker. The model
has a binomial structure, i.e., Ω = {−1,+1}T , the filtration (Ft)t=1,...,T is
generated by Yt(ω) , yt for ω = (y1, . . . , yT ) ∈ Ω, t = 1, . . . , T , and we
assume P[{ω}] > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. The payoff ψ can be any real-valued
FT -measurable random variable.
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Theorem 4.4. For a market maker with exponential utility, a binomial model
as described above is complete if and only if at any time we see a new best
lower bound for ψ in one possible evolution to the next time period and a new
best upper bound for ψ in the other:
(30) Ω =
{
ψ
t−1
< ψ
t
}
∪
{
ψ
t−1
> ψ
t
}
, t = 1, . . . , T .
Proof. By passing to P′ with dP′/dP = e−αΣ0/Ee−αΣ0 we can assume Σ0 =
0 without loss of generality. We will proceed through a number auxiliary
claims:
Claim 1: H ∈ FT is attainable by a strategy Q with initial capital pi
H if
and only if
(31) piH =
1
α
log
(
E
[
eαH
])
and Q is a predictable process that satisfies
(32)
E
[
eαH |Ft
]
E [eαH |Ft−1]
=
E
[
e−αQtψ|Ft
]
E [e−αQtψ|Ft−1]
, on {Yt = +1} , t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
Indeed, if H is attainable by a strategy Q with initial cost piH , then
−1 = u(0) = E [u (XT +QTψ)] = E
[
u(piH −H)
]
= −e−αpi
H
E
[
eαH
]
,
since H = pi − XT − QTψ. Therefore, the price pi
H and the utility
process U satisfy
piH =
1
α
log
(
E
[
eαH
])
Ut
Ut−1
=
E
[
u
(
piH −H
)
|Ft
]
E [u (piH −H) |Ft−1]
=
E
[
eαH |Ft
]
E [eαH |Ft−1]
, t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
On the other hand, by predictability of the associated cash process X ,
Ut−1 = E [u (Xt +Qtψ) |Ft−1] = −e
−αXtE
[
e−αQtψ|Ft−1
]
, t = 1, 2, . . . , T
which implies that
Ut
Ut−1
=
E
[
e−αQtψ|Ft
]
E [e−αQtψ|Ft−1]
, t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
Hence, the strategy Q satisfies (32).
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Conversely, let piH be given by (31) and Q be predictable with (32).
Then, in fact, the identity in (32) holds on all of Ω = {Yt = +1} ∪
{Yt = −1} because the random variable on either side has conditional
expectation 1 given Ft−1. Now let U0 = u(0) and let U be the process
defined recursively by
Ut
Ut−1
=
E
[
eαH |Ft
]
E [eαH |Ft−1]
=
E
[
e−αQtψ|Ft
]
E [e−αQtψ|Ft−1]
t = 1, 2, . . . , T.
Then according to (31)
UT
U0
=
T∏
s=1
Us
Us−1
=
eαH
E [eαH ]
= e−α(pi
H−H).
On the other hand, X given by
Xt =
1
α
log
(
−
E
[
e−αQtψ|Ft−1
]
Ut−1
)
, t = 1, 2, . . . , T,
is the cash process of Q with indirect utility U . In particular, for t = T ,
we have UT = u(0)e
−α(XT+QTψ), and since UT = u(0)e
−α(piH−H) we get
that
piH −XT −QTψ = H .
Claim 2: As H varies over all the FT -measurable random variables, the
left side of (32) sweeps for fixed t = 1, . . . , T precisely across all the
random variables Zt with E [Zt|Ft−1] = 1 which are of the form Zt =
ft(Y1, . . . , Yt) for some function ft : {−1,+1}
t → (0,∞) such that
0 < ft(Y1, . . . , Yt−1, yt) < 1/P [Yt = yt|Ft−1] , yt ∈ {−1,+1} .
Indeed, this is readily checked from
E [Zt|Ft−1] =ft(Y1, . . . , Yt−1,+1)P [Yt = +1|Ft−1]
+ ft(Y1, . . . , Yt−1,−1)P [Yt = −1|Ft−1] .
Claim 3: As Qt varies over the Ft−1-measurable random variables, the
right side of (32) varies over the open interval bounded by P t ,
P
[
ψ=ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft]
P
[
ψ=ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft−1] and P t ,
P
[
ψ=ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft]
P
[
ψ=ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft−1] .
Indeed, this follows by the same argument as given in the proof for the
second claim in Proposition 1.
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In light of Claims 1–3, completeness holds if and only if for any t =
1, . . . , T we have
P t ∧ P t = 0 and P t ∨ P t = 1/P [Yt = yt|Ft−1] .
It follows that completeness yields{
P t ≤ P t
}
⊆ {P t = 0} =
{
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft] = 0} = {ψt−1 < ψt}
and, similarly,{
P t ≥ P t
}
⊆
{
P t = 0
}
=
{
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft] = 0} = {ψt−1 > ψt} .
In particular, completeness implies (30). Conversely, observe{
ψ
t−1
> ψ
t
}
∪
{
ψ
t−1
> ψ
t
}
= {P t = 0} ∪
{
P t = 0
}
and thus (30) yields P t ∧ P t = 0. To conclude we need to argue that P t ∨
P t(ω) = 1/P [Yt = yt|Ft−1] (ω) for ω = (y1, . . . , yT ) ∈ Ω. Without loss of
generality, it is sufficient to prove for
ω ∈ {P t > 0} =
{
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft] > 0} = {ψt = ψt−1}
we have in fact P t(ω) = 1/P [Yt = yt|Ft−1] (ω). We recall that
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft−1] = E [P [ψ = ψt−1∣∣∣Ft]∣∣∣Ft−1] .
Thus P t(ω) = 1/P [Yt = yt|Ft−1] (ω) is equivalent to having
P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft] (ω′) = 0
where ω′ = (y′1, . . . , y
′
T ) ∈ Ω is given by y
′
s , ys for s 6= t and y
′
t , −yt. So
assume for a contradiction P
[
ψ = ψ
t−1
∣∣∣Ft] (ω′) > 0. Then we have ψt(ω′) =
ψ
t−1
(ω′) in addition to ψ
t
(ω) = ψ
t−1
(ω). By (30), this implies ψt(ω) >
ψt−1(ω) and ψt(ω
′) > ψt−1(ω
′) in contradiction to ψt−1(ω) = ψt−1(ω
′) =
ψt(ω) ∧ ψt(ω
′).
Remark 4.5. For the model with binomial lattice structure considered in this
section, one can show by similar arguments that there exists a superreplicat-
ing strategy if
∅ 6=
{
ψ
t−1
< ψ
t
}
∪
{
ψ
t−1
> ψ
t
}
, t = 1, . . . , T .
Moreover, in Section 4.1 we provide an example, where superreplicating cost
is not attained in the case
∅ =
{
ψ
0
< ψ
1
}
∪
{
ψ
0
> ψ
1
}
.
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5 Examples of processes with decreasing ex-
ponential tails
To illustrate that our assumption of decreasing exponential tails is satisfied
by typical models considered for stock prices, let us study a few examples.
5.1 Le´vy processes
Lemma 5.1. Let (Xt)t≥0 be a non-deterministic one-dimensional Le´vy pro-
cess with respect to the filtration (Ft)t≥0. Suppose that XT has all exponential
moments, i.e. for all q ∈ R, E
[
eqXT
]
<∞. Then
ψ , XT
exhibits decreasing exponential tails in the sense of condition (12).
Proof. Let us denote the Le´vy triplet of X by (b, c, µ), where b ∈ R, c ≥ 0
and µ is a Le´vy measure on R satisfying
(33) µ({0}) = 0,
∫
R
(
1 ∧ |x|2
)
µ(dx) <∞.
We exclude the deterministic case where both c = 0 and µ = 0 and we require
that XT has all exponential moments, i.e. for all q ∈ R, E
[
eqXT
]
<∞. This
is equivalent to stating
(34)
∫
{|x|≥1}
eqx µ(dx) <∞, q ∈ R.
SinceX has homogeneous and independent increments we will have νt+h ≺
νt for h > 0 where νs , P [XT ∈ ·|Fs], s ∈ [0, T ], if
(35)
E
[
eqψ|Ft+h
]
E [eqψ|Ft]
= exp(q(Xt+h −Xt)− hf(q))→ 0 as |q| ↑ ∞
where due to the Le´vy-Khintchine formula
f(q) = bq +
1
2
cq2 +
∫
R
{
eqx − 1− qx1{|x|<1}
}
µ(dx).
By considering first X and then −X we can confine ourselves to considering
the limit as q ↑ ∞.
25
Case ‘µ((0,∞) > 0’: We shall show that
∫
R
{
eqx − 1− qx1{|x|<1}
}
µ(dx) con-
verges to ∞ exponentially fast as q ↑ ∞ which entails the same con-
vergence for f(q) and thus proves (35).
Indeed, if ε ∈ (0, 1) is chosen such that µ((ε,∞)) > 0 then
(36)
∫
(ε,∞)
{
eqx − 1− qx1{|x|<1}
}
µ(dx) ≥ (eqε − (1 + q))µ((ε,∞))
converges to ∞ exponentially fast as q ↑ ∞. At the same time we can
use the Taylor expansion
eqx = 1 + qx+
1
2
z2 for some z = z(qx) between 0 and qx
to see first that
(37)
∫
(0,ε)
{
eqx − 1− qx1{|x|<1}
}
µ(dx) ≥ 0
and second that
(38)
∫
(−∞,0)
{
eqx − 1− qx1{|x|<1}
}
µ(dx) ≥
∫
(−∞,0)
qx1{|x|≥1} µ(dx) .
Since the exponential moment condition (34) implies
∫
|x|1{|x|≥1} µ(dx) <
∞, the latter expression may diverge to −∞ at most linearly fast in q.
The summation of (36), (37) and (38) thus proves the claimed expo-
nential divergence of
∫
R
{
eqx − 1− qx1{|x|<1}
}
µ(dx) to ∞.
Case ‘µ((0,∞)) = 0’: In this case we infer from (38) that the integral in
the definition of f(q) may converge to −∞ for q ↑ ∞ at most at the
deterministic linear rate r ,
∫
(−∞,0)
|x|1{|x|≥1} µ(dx) <∞. Hence, f(q)
will diverge to +∞ quadratically in q if c > 0 in which case (36) holds
on Ω. If c = 0, f(q) may converge to −∞ at most with linear speed
|b|+ r. Hence, recalling that the argument for the previous case shows
that the limit q ↓ −∞ in (35) holds on Ω, it suffices to observe that (35)
will hold for q ↑ ∞ on {Xt+h −Xt − h(|b|+ r) < 0}, a set with positive
probability if c = 0, µ(0,∞) = 0 unless X is deterministic which we
have ruled out from the start.
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5.2 A model of Barndorff-Nielsen Shephard-type
Clearly, Laplace transforms can be computed in many financial models and so
our condition of decreasing exponential tails can be checked in more complex
models as well. By way of illustration let us consider a stochastic volatility
model in the style of Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard [4].
Lemma 5.2. Let Z = (Zt)t≥0 be a Le´vy subordinator on a filtered probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft),P) with Le´vy measure µ such that
(39) κ(θ) , log
(
E
[
eθZ1
])
=
∫ ∞
0
(
eθy − 1
)
µ(dy) <∞, θ ∈ R
and W = (Wt)t≥0 be an independent Brownian motion of Z. Assume the
payoff of the marketed claim is given by
ψ = XT
where (Xt)t∈[0,T ] follows the Barndorff-Nielsen Shephard dynamics
dXt =
(
m+ βσ2t
)
dt+ σtdWt + ρdZλt,
dσ2t = −λσ
2
t dt+ dZλt, σ
2
0 > 0.
for some constants m, β ∈ R, λ > 0 and ρ < 0. Then ψ exhibits decreasing
exponential tails in the sense of condition (12).
Proof. The Laplace transform E
[
eqXT |Ft
]
is computed in Nicolato and Ve-
nardos [22]:
E
[
eqXT
∣∣Ft] =
(40)
exp
(
q (Xt +m(T − t)) +
(
q2 + 2βq
) ε(t, T )
2
σ2t +
∫ T
t
λκ (f(s, q)) ds
)
,
where
ε(s, T ) ,
1
λ
(
1− e−λ(T−s)
)
,
f(s, q) , ρq +
1
2
(
q2 + 2βq
)
ε(s, T ).
Moreover, according to Theorem 2 in Nicolato and Venardos [22], under
condition (39) E
[
eqXT |Ft
]
< ∞ for every q ∈ R, i.e. ψ = XT has all
exponential moments.
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We claim that for any h > 0 we have νt+h ≺ νt where as before νs ,
P [ψ ∈ ·|Fs]. From (40) it suffices to show
lim
|q|→∞
{
q (Xt+h −Xt −mh) +
(
q2 + 2βq
)(ε(t+ h, T )
2
σ2t+h −
ε(t, T )
2
σ2t
)(41)
−
∫ t+h
t
λκ(f(s, q))ds
}
= −∞.
To show this, we note that by Taylor expansion
κ(f(s, q)) =
∫ ∞
0
(
ef(s,q)y − 1
)
µ(dy)
≥
∫ ∞
0
(
f(s, q)y +
1
2
f(s, q)2y2 +
1
6
f(s, q)3y3
)
µ(dy) .
For fixed s ∈ [t, t+ h] and y > 0 we obtain by direct calculation
F (s, q, y) , f(s, q)y +
1
2
f(s, q)2y2 +
1
6
f(s, q)3y3
=
1
48
q6ε(s, T )3y3 + P5(s, q, y),
where P5 is a polynomial of order 5 in q. The coefficients of this polynomial
P5 are functions of s and y, where the dependence of P5 on s is continuous.
Moreover, since κ(θ) <∞ for all θ, we have that∫ ∞
0
ynµ(dy) <∞, n = 1, 2, . . . .
Hence,
λ
∫ t+h
t
κ(f(s, q))ds ≥ λ
∫ t+h
t
∫ ∞
0
F (s, q, y)µ(dy)ds
and the latter expression is a polynomial of order 6 in q with positive leading
coefficient. Thus, the integral term dominates all other terms in (41) and we
obtain the claimed convergence.
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